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Abstract
In the 21st century, warfare has evolved into a challenge that many 
countries are ill prepared to face. In contrast to the warfare of 
yesterday, victory is not defined by defeating an opposing military 
force, but rather defeating their ability to pursue political objectives 
by violent, often unconventional, means. Increasingly, these 
unconventional means are based on asymmetries between the two 
opposing forces.
A plethora of definitions for the term ‘asymmetric conflict’ exist, but 
they can largely be summarized by a general idea that one side in a 
conflict, due to its own failings or its opponents’ strength, is unable 
to achieve its political aims through conventional (i.e. symmetric) 
military means. Because of this, the weaker side uses new ideas, 
weapons and tactics in a manner that is not expected, exploiting 
surprise to undermine the relative strength(s) of their opponent 
(Lele, 2014).  The character of contemporary asymmetric threats can 
be analyzed through a framework of several key characteristics, 
which will be described in this paper.  Understanding this framework, 
particularly in light of the horizontal transfer of technology, 
tactics, organization structure and procedures between emerging 
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Introduction
Developments since the end of the Cold War, especially 
in the peripheral areas of competition of the previously 
opposed ideological blocs, as well as the increasingly common 
manifestation of difficult to predict asymmetric threats have 
fundamentally changed the global security environment. 
This change has, in turn, defined a need for analysis driven 
strategies and policies which will effectively counter these 
emerging security threats.  Accordingly, an objective evaluation 
of existing strategies and policies is necessary, as well as the 
development of new ones (Katzman and Thomas 2017: 26). 
Perhaps the best illustrations of the complexity of these ongoing 
cyclical processes of interdisciplinary analysis, strategy and 
policy development, followed by their final implementation 
in the area of operations are visible in the international 
counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. Specifically, despite 
the fact that the international military presence in Afghanistan 
is entering its 17th year, the lack of decisive results indicates 
that the approach taken by the international community (and 
more specifically NATO) to address this security challenge has 
not been entirely effective.  However, the wealth of strategic 
and operational insight resulting from the most significant 
multinational military operation of the 21st century (in terms of 
duration, lives lost and resources expended), may hold valuable 
lessons that may be applicable to other forms of asymmetric 
threats. 
It is important to note that as of the writing of this article, 
contemporary wisdom regarding asymmetric threats has 
already been significantly inf luenced by multinational 
experiences in Afghanistan.  Namely, contemporary 
approaches to asymmetric threats stress the need for unity 
of effort in a multinational context, as well as the careful 
application of significant diplomatic, intelligence, military 
and economic resources based on a high level of understanding 
of the historical and cultural context of the specific threat. 
Remarkably, this type of analysis (and consequent strategic 
approach) marked a significant departure from the early 
counterinsurgent efforts in Afghanistan, which were best 
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or non-governmental), which were often of dubious quality 
and legitimacy.1 Under pressure from a deteriorating 
security environment, however, counterinsurgent efforts 
in Afghanistan adapted and evolved to include complex 
interdisciplinary analysis that sought to better understand 
and evaluate the conduct of the counterinsurgency, and 
these efforts characterized the Anti-Taliban Military efforts 
from 2003-2009 in large measure. Thus, analysis driven 
strategy and policy was recognizable throughout the end 
of the NATO ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) 
mission in 2014, and has continued in the still operational 
Resolute Support Mission that started in 2015 (Katzman and 
Thomas 2017).  
Recognizing the importance of understanding the 
historical and cultural context of emerging threats, NATO 
itself implemented joint multidimensional analysis of the 
operational environment into its doctrine in 2011, and first 
applied this form of comprehensive analysis during the 
initial attempts to find a solution to the then-raging Libyan 
conflict (Sokolsky 2017).  Despite significant differences 
between the conflicts in Libya and Afghanistan, NATO’s joint 
multidimensional analysis of the operational environment 
in Libya, which was based largely on experiences in 
Afghanistan, facilitated a better understanding of the 
specific regional context and implications of a potential 
intervention.  This understanding encompassed important 
dynamics such as specific national legislation, tribal 
codes, religious structures and their influence, as well 
as local socioeconomic conditions (Dawoody 2016:169). 
Consequently, we can ascertain that insight resulting 
from years of experience in Afghanistan was applicable 
in unrelated and dissimilar unconventional asymmetric 
challenges. Moreover, in the period to come, the strategic 
and operational insights gained in Afghanistan may yet 
shed light on contemporary and future unconventional 
threats such as violent extremism, terrorism, insurgencies, 
or information warfare, and may hold the key to their timely 
and effective mitigation.
1 Contemporary asymmetric military operations increasingly make use of traning 
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A brief overview of contemporary threats
Globalization, international agreements and economic 
benefits have influenced the development of a relatively 
stable and peaceful international environment for a majority 
of developed nations (Harris 2010).  In the contemporary 
world, nation states have professional militaries and capable 
intelligence agencies, and are not overly concerned by the 
prospect of conventional invasion from their neighbouring 
states.  In contrast with historical experience, it seems that in 
the 21st century, the main security threats are posed by non-
attributable hostile acts by aggressive nation states, as well as 
violence perpetrated by extremists, terrorists and organized 
crime (non-state actors).  These actors share a common 
characteristic in that they do not fall within established 
territorial and legislative boundaries (Rynegeart 2017: 156). 
Furthermore, these type of actors initiate conflicts and utilize 
unconventional tactics to achieve their political or other aims 
(Hartley 2017: 21).  Some of the most common manifestations of 
these asymmetric threats in the past twenty years have been 
violent extremism, terrorism and insurgency, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and information warfare. 
Violent extremism has been manifested through over 235 
terror incidents around the world since November 2016. 
These attacks have left 2030 dead and 2348 injured (CACI 
International 2017). At the same time, the Islamic State (IS), 
Al Qaeda and other radical Jihadist organizations continue 
to spread their radical ideology and attempt to radicalize 
and induce followers to commit acts of terror (Shuck 2015: 2).
In light of these figures, terrorism is perhaps the 
manifestation of asymmetric threat that has garnered the 
most attention.  It involves the calculated use of force with 
an aim of inspiring terror in order to coerce a government 
or society into adopting political, religious or ideological 
objectives.  Terrorism and terrorist threats have changed 
dramatically in the last 15 years, primarily because of evolving 
terrorist motivations, the rise of information technology 
and the corresponding ease with which information is 
disseminated, the accelerating urban centralization of 
vital components of national infrastructure, as well as the 
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Insurgency, one of the forms of asymmetric conflict, is defined 
as an organized political and military revolt which has a 
goal of weakening or overthrowing a government or other 
political authority, with the complementary aim of increasing 
one’s own control over a population (Black 2016).  In contrast, 
counterinsurgency is defined as the combined political, 
economic, social and security measures which are taken to 
prevent and/or defeat armed violence, as well as to establish 
stable political, economic, social and security structures, as well 
as to address the fundamental causes of the insurgency, with 
an ultimate aim of establishing and defending stability in a 
given area (Hampsey 2010).
Weapons of mass destruction are weapons which can kill large 
numbers of people and cause catastrophic damage to cities, 
countries, nature and the biosphere, and are most commonly 
categorized as nuclear (to include ‘dirty bombs’), biological and/
or chemical agents (Hayoun and Goldstein 2017).  In addition 
to traditional state actors, who have sought to acquire such 
weapons as a means of punching above their weight in local or 
regional international relations or as a means of guaranteeing 
the survival of their regime (i.e. Sadaam Hussein in Iraq, 
Moamar Ghaddafi in Libya), various non-state actors have 
increasingly undertaken efforts to acquire WMD’s (i.e. Osama 
bin Laden first stated that his ‘Islamic Duty’ was to acquire WMD 
in 1998, then repeated his threat to use them in a 2007 video). 
Many consider a possibility of WMDs in the hands of these 
non-state actors as a particularly dangerous development, as 
the difficulty of attributing a WMD attack conducted by such 
an actor to the actual perpetrator might encourage their 
operational use. 
Information warfare encompasses any activity directed 
against the information and value system of a targeted country, 
organization or group of people.  Information warfare involves 
the use of superior methods of information development (from 
raw or unprocessed data) and decision making based on true (or 
better) understanding. This type of warfare has been developed 
by technologically advanced societies and militaries in order 
to undermine opponents’ abilities to develop understanding 
from information. Generally speaking, information warfare 
operations can be used most effectively against opponents 
who are similarly technologically advanced, and enables its 
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for direct exposure and identification. Today, the Islamic State 
uses offensive information warfare to attack not only military 
targets, but civilian ones, too. In its eyes, there is no such thing 
as civilian status beyond the caliphate’s boundaries (Frampton 
at al 2017: 31).  Thus, media weapons are calibrated with a view 
to attacking disengaged publics as much as they are geared 
towards hitting engaged militaries (Winter 2017: 18).
Conventional vs. asymmetric conflicts
As Clausewitz famously wrote, war is the continuation 
of politics. Consequently, political conflict is the basis for 
all conflict, to include terrorism and insurgent asymmetric 
conflicts, especially as both terrorists and insurgents base 
their legitimacy and power on the support that they enjoy in 
the populace that they claim to represent.  This central premise 
has traditionally been the main factor guiding the conduct of 
insurgent operations in contrast to conventional warfare and 
its focus on traditional military targets.  Thus, it can be said that 
contemporary manifestations of asymmetric warfare have had 
pronounced socio-political significance, as opposed to specific 
social, economic or military benefits (Huba 2006). Fredholm 
stated that conflicts occur for personal, ideological or economic 
reasons, or a combination of these factors, yet the acquisition 
of power tends to be paramount as motive (Fredholm 2017: 7). 
In conventional warfare, military action, supported by 
diplomacy, information operations and economic pressure, is 
the primary mechanism for achieving the end goal.  Politics 
as a mechanism for objective realization dominates during 
the planning and preparation of conflicts, but becomes 
secondary during the conflict itself.  In other words, politics 
in a conventional conflict is not dominant during the conduct 
of the war, which makes it possible to delineate among 
various actors: the government which guides operations, the 
population which provides the means, and the military which 
uses them (Galula 1964).
The role of politics in an asymmetric conflict is significantly 
different. Considering that both parties in the conflict seek 
to influence public opinion, a political position of the two 
sides is primary; the insurgents seek to gain the trust and 
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to prevent the populace from falling under the influence of 
the insurgents.  It is not enough for the government to set 
political objectives, to determine the necessary force required 
to achieve these objectives, to enter alliances, and then to 
monitor developments in the conflict from a distance, hoping 
for a positive outcome.  In an asymmetric conflict, because 
of the particularity of the objectives and the conduct of the 
conflict itself, politics is an active mechanism which ensures 
that each military act is viewed through a prism of potential 
costs and potential benefits.2 To conclude, the key to successful 
counterinsurgency is effective governance, because the entire 
conflict and its outcome is largely decided by the success of 
each side in gaining and maintaining credibility among the 
populace (Military Review, 2014: 36). Quite often, the stronger 
governmental opponent’s primary means for achieving this 
credibility is the ability to govern effectively.
2  Cost-Benefit analysis.
Figure 1  
The characteristics 
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Characteristics of asymmetric actors structure
The operational structure of the opposing sides in an 
asymmetric conflict is fundamentally different.  On one side, 
we have a traditional military and political hierarchy which 
relies on the economic, political and diplomatic power of the 
state whose interests it defends.  On the other side, we have a 
heterogeneously structured and heterogeneously motivated 
group, which often adopts a non-hierarchical structure by 
choice or chance to pursue a common cause.  Terrorist groups 
adopt a non-hierarchical, cellular and/or mesh structure on 
purpose in order to avoid detection and make identification 
of their members in case of the compromise more difficult. 
Because of this compartmentalization, members of a terrorist 
cell often know only other members of the same cell, and thus 
are unable to divulge information concerning the identities 
and work of other insurgent cells when discovered and 
interrogated (Fredholm 2017: 32).
Another similar form of asymmetric actor structure is one 
based on a tribal structure such as those in Afghanistan and 
the tribal areas of Pakistan, which can be described as an 
unintentionally formed non-hierarchical structure.  In these 
structures, groups form on the basis of existing family and 
tribal ties, and the penetration of such groups, or the winning 
over members of these groups, is extremely difficult because 
of a high level of distrust for strangers and the strength of the 
social connections between group members.
Different organizational structures (which are often 
modular) have allowed once local, or in the best case regional, 
organizations to expand their operations into an international 
and global environment.  Technology, to include web based 
technologies, have enabled the rise of globally connected actors, 
who have the ability to act quickly and effectively anywhere 
in the world.  The fundamental functioning of these types of 
organizational strucutres is very simple yet effective.  Precisely 
because of this, they represent a significant challenge for 
Intelligence and Law Enforcement entities, who have struggled 
to develop effective strategies for countering such asymmetric 
opponents.  Namely, the traditional approach applied to 
hierarchically structured opponents enabled security forces to 
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in Clausewitzian terms, which resulted in a total degradation 
of the organization’s ability to act.  In the case of asymmetric 
actors, the destruction of one cell does not substantially effect 
the ability of the organization to conduct further operations. 
Another problem is that individual cells may not conduct 
independent attacks, but rather provide resources which are 
amalgamated in the final stages of preparation for an attack, 
giving security forces a tiny window for preventative action.  A 
key characteristic of the matrix organizational structure is that 
the destruction of an individual actor or leader has minimal 
effect on the operations of the group while at the same time 
contributing to the radicalization of the group’s members. 
The Afghan Taliban example illustrates the fact that most 
operational coordination occurs at the tactical level, while 
broad ideological and strategic guidance is issued from the 
highest levels of leadership located in Pakistani safe havens.
A similar phenomenon is recognizable in recent attacks in 
Europe. Namely, attacks have been carried out at broadly 
dispersed geographic locations, not only under the auspices 
of the IS, but also of several other Jihadist groups, with little 
or no operational involvement from the countries of origin of 
such groups. This suggests that a significant decentralization 
in operational terrorist structures has occurred and as a result, 
we have progressed to the current manifestation of Islamic 
terrorism – reciprocally independent radicalized groups 
and/or individuals, who are geographically and quite often 
logistically autonomous, and who are able to operationalize 
their intent with little or no external assistance (Brzica, 2017).
Use of contemporary information and communication 
technologies
The Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
revolution has greatly enhanced the ease of communication, 
financing, distribution, planning, the recruitment of new 
members, as well as the propaganda efforts of asymmetric 
actors.  In fact, access to and use of ICT technologies, in addition 
to the security and organizational vulnerabilities of traditional 
hierarchical organizations outlined above, has resulted in a 
relative decline of hierarchically structured organizations 
among asymmetric actors.  In ICT facilitated, matrix (or 
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a single cell does not produce spectacular results because of 
the distributed nature and mutually independent structure 
of the organization, thus guaranteeing greater operational 
survivability.  In light of these developments, in recent years 
the Middle East has witnessed the appearance of tech savvy 
“techno-terrorists” (Hartman 2002). Recent operations in 
Afghanistan have also exposed advanced communication 
techniques used by asymmetric actors who use satellite 
telephones, mobile phones, computers, the Internet, e-mail and 
other web based technologies to a surprising degree to support 
ongoing operations, as well as to plan future operations.  Hamas 
also provides a textbook example of the application of new 
technologies by a non-state asymmetric actor.  Namely, Hamas 
plans the majority of its operation using communications via 
the Internet, but also makes use of the Internet for propaganda 
purposes as well as for communicating with its sympathizers in 
remote locations, exploiting the „safe“ Internet infrastructure 
available in Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon. Another non-
state asymmetric actor, Hezbollah, uses its websites to describe 
and publicize information (to include video footage) of 
recently conducted attacks, as well as to disseminate news and 
propaganda to its followers and sympathizers (Miller 2014: 82). 
Intelligence and security agencies have not been inactive in 
responding to the security implications of ICT advances.  The 
beginning of 2016 was marked by grandiose claims that the 
IS would be obliterated from cyberspace by the end of the 
year (Forno and Joshi, 2016).  However, almost two years later, 
it is apparent that the presence of the Islamic State and other 
extremist organizations on the Internet continues to be a major 
problem, primarily because it enables the Jihadist network 
to keep including new supporters and thus to constantly 
evolve and expand (Frampton et al. 2017: 31).  It is irrefutable 
that the Internet facilitates rapid spread of information to 
broad audiences, while also enabling quick changes between 
communications platforms and almost instantaneous 
migration from one virtual location to another.  In addition, the 
Internet has proven to be an excellent instrument in the hands 
of extremist organizations for propaganda dissemination, as 
well as the radicalization and recruitment of new adherents 
(Brzica 2017).
Despite the examples outlined above, it is a mistake to link 
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exclusively to new technologies.  Some terrorist organizations 
are quite adept at working within established technologies and 
highly regulated economic environments. Paramilitary groups 
in Northern Ireland, for example, make use of legal entities such 
as hotels, pubs, taxi companies and other legitimate business to 
launder money and finance political activities.
Financing
The acquisition of financial means and their effective 
and timely allocation among individual elements (cells) of a 
group is of utmost importance for terrorist groups.  Financing 
activities in the area of operations directly affect the costs of 
operations and survival, varying in degree from group to group 
and location to location. In virtually all cases, planning and 
execution of operations, financing of personnel and operations, 
as well as enabling activities such as bribing and recruitment, 
require large amounts of money which are collected from 
numerous sources, which are increasingly dispersed globally. 
Regarding the financing of asymmetric actors, several trends are 
recognizable.  The first trend relates to distributed financing by 
radical sympathizers, with the financing of the IRA by the large 
Irish diaspora in the US given as one of the earliest examples. 
Other comparable examples include the collection of finances 
in support of an attempt assassination of the former Egyptian 
President Mubarak, when millions of dollars were transferred 
from the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia via banks 
in New York and London to Al Qaeda, whereas the banks were 
unaware of the true purpose of these transactions (Gunarathna 
2003).  A second trend in the financing of asymmetric actors 
is the widespread adoption of measures to avoid regulatory 
measures intended to prevent money laundering.  Most recent 
studies show that everyone dealing in illicit markets, from the 
inane copyright infringers to brutal human traffickers, can 
find comfort in the anonymity of cryptocurrency—especially 
terrorists. As Telley states, as early as 2015, ISIS was suspected 
of having moved funds through Bitcoin and a Salafi-jihadist 
group in Gaza conducted a fundraising campaign, under the 
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Socioeconomic considerations
Sociological considerations are very important in 
understanding the nature of asymmetric conflict. Peter A. 
Olsson has developed a “personal pathway model” to describe 
the evolution of insurgent conflict (Cunningham 2001). 
According to his model, individuals who suffer a specific 
threat to their ethnic identity and are motivated by ethnic 
nationalism rather than ideology, perceive themselves to be 
freedom fighters. Viewed from socioeconomic and sociocultural 
vantage points, the number of people who consider themselves 
to be abandoned, demonized, exploited and subject to unfair 
treatment increases over time, and their dissatisfaction 
transforms into violence, which then becomes the primary 
manifestation of this dissatisfaction (Najetović 2011).  A 
recent example of this type of behaviour are the recent „Arab 
Spring“ revolutions which deposed numerous authoritarian 
dictatorships in North Africa, including the Ben Ali regime in 
Tunisia which was sparked by the suicide of a street vendor 
after he was detained and humiliated by Tunisian police 
officers (Stradiotto and Guo 2014: 112). 
Social stratification within countries and within the 
international order contribute to alienation in the 
contemporary world (Vukasović 2009), and it is precisely 
because of this that certain societal groups consider their 
own predicaments such to induce them to undertake some 
form of asymmetric conflict, be it terrorism, insurgency 
or something else.  When examining asymmetric conflicts 
from a sociological vantage point, it is necessary to take into 
account the importance of the demographic underpinnings 
of the conflict.  This aspect is quite evident in Afghanistan, 
where there is a large number of unemployed young men 
who face a decision on whether they wish to be perceived as 
a ‘drain’ on a society already hampered by limited resources, 
or be perceived as a ‘hero’ who is fighting for the ‘freedom’ of 
his ethnic and/or religious identity (Landinfo 2017:15).  This 
same phenomenon could be readily recognized in Northern 
Ireland, where the Catholic community had a traditionally 
high rate of demographic growth, while at the same time 
having a high rate of unemployment, due in no small part 
to institutional discrimination.  As in the period when the 
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a high rate of unemployed young males see membership in 
terrorist organizations as a reasonable option.  However, it is 
important to mention that demographic changes in Northern 
Ireland may soon result in a Catholic majority, which in turn 
will most likely destimulate the pursuit of political objectives 
with violence as the very same objectives should be attainable 
through legal democratic means.
Some theorists believe that social bonds, most often those 
related to family and clan, have the biggest impact on 
individuals who are facing a decision on whether or not to join 
an asymmetric actor.  In these cases, traditional methods of 
winning ‘hearts and minds’ (a fundamental tenet of population-
centred counterinsurgency) have limited results considering 
that arguments based on economic and/or political facts do not 
fall on fertile ground among the members of a tribal society 
(Springer 2008.)
Ideology
Ideology has an enormous inf luence in mobilizing 
populations. Political ideology refers primarily to ideas 
about common values and promotion of political behaviour 
which aligns with ideals or ideas about a desired state with 
the suggestion of creating, mobilizing, guiding, organizing 
or justifying a certain type of behaviour.  The term also 
encompasses a definition of a certain societal actor’s (group, 
class) interests, and the efforts to publicize and achieve these 
interests through political processes (Ravlić 2001).
Other theorists contend that ideology is a set of beliefs and 
positions which justify a certain action, and they identify the 
functions of ideology as follows:
 — Ideology polarizes and mobilizes a populace, 
directing them towards common goals
 — Ideology creates a sense of security, providing a set of 
rules and values
 — Ideology represents the foundation for justifying 
and rationalizing human behaviour (Violence and 
Terrorism 2004).
Ideology can thus be considered a cohesive force which serves 
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Keeping this in mind, we can conclude that the ideology 
which is able to dominate in an asymmetrical conf lict 
offers, through radicalization of its adherents, means that a 
relatively weaker party can effectively counter an economically, 
technologically and numerically stronger adversary.  Viewed 
from this perspective, it is quite appropriate to conclude that 
ideology is one of the most important factors in asymmetric 
conflicts.  Both Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar were on 
top of allied priorities in the asymmetric conflict with radical 
Islam, primarily because of the ideological guidance that 
they issued to followers and sympathizers throughout the 
Islamic world and beyond (Neumann 2008:55). Neither of the 
two issued daily operational instructions to insurgent groups, 
or did they direct tactical operations.  However, the influence 
of the two individuals mentioned was unquestionable while 
they were alive, as the influence of the Jihadi network is 
today.  Interestingly, in the same manner that ideology plays a 
prominent role in shaping insurgent strategy, it must do so in 
counterinsurgency strategy.  Counterinsurgents must always 
take care to ensure that their ideology is acceptable to the 
population whose “hearts and minds” they seek to win over.
Conclusion
It is becoming increasingly evident that unconventional 
asymmetric security challenges of today, such as violent 
extremism, terrorism, insurgencies, or information warfare 
require strategic and policy measures outside the realm 
of conventional approaches.  Unlike relatively clear-cut 
procedures of a conventional state vs. state conflicts that marked 
the Cold War, nation states are increasinglyconfronting non 
state actors, ranging from terrorist organizations to radical 
ideological movements.  Moreover, these types of threats cannot 
be fought by reactive measures alone. A mitigating strategy and 
policy must be based on extensive interdisciplinary analysis, 
which take into account specific historical, cultural and other 
aspects of each individual challenge. Perhaps the strategic and 
operational insights acquired in the largest counterinsurgency 
operation of the 21st century, in Afghanistan, can facilitate 
understanding of other, seemingly unrelated and dissimilar 
asymmetric threats as was the case with operational planning 
from the Libyan intervention in 2011.  In light of this, it should 









XXIV (83) 2018, 
34-51
of discrete and geographically distant asymmetric actors, 
ranging from terrorist organizations to online producers 
and disseminators of radical Jihadist propaganda.  Likewise, 
the rise of ICT, particularly the rise of mobile devices and 
their protected communication applications, allows for 
the facilitation of a range of activities which can enable 
everything from the proliferation of WMD and planning of 
terrorist attacks, to radicalization and recruitment of new 
generations of terrorists.  Additionally, ideology, whether it be 
radical Jihadist or Anarchist and Anti-Western, will continue 
to play an important role in the motivations of individual 
asymmetric actors, particularly among those operating on the 
fringes of democracy.  Perhaps the most poorly understood 
aspect of contemporary asymmetric threats is their financing, 
particularly in light of recent crypto currency advances. 
Namely, it is quite possible that intelligence and security 
agencies will face significant challenges in the future in piecing 
together global flows of illicit funds considering what block 
chain technologies seem to offer: anonymity, non-traceability, 
truly global outreach, and near instantaneous execution of 
transactions.  Finally, socioeconomic considerations remain a 
central aspect of understanding the motivations of individual 
asymmetric actors, ranging from the lack of available 
meaningful employment which may push individuals along 
the path to criminally or politically motivated violence to 
acute perceptions of political, religious and identity alienation 
which seem to play an increasing role in the radicalization 
of Jihadists originating in Western countries.  One must also 
keep in mind that in efforts to mitigate the asymmetric threats 
mentioned above, democratic states are often faced with 
obfuscated realities and conflicting objectives which directly 
contradict a goal of maintaining peace and security.  Finally, 
in light of global trends toward deregulation and integration, 
open borders and the global economy, it is quite possible that 
characteristics of asymmetric actors once limited to specific 
geographic areas or operational forms, may soon appear in 
entirely different regions and contexts.
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